By:Dr.Maytham Rasheed Hameed / College of Islamic Sciences, Department of Arabic Language
It is remarkable that Noam Chomsky wrote an article titled “Of Minds and Language” (2007). The title touches upon two realities: one pertains to the minds that drive language, and the other relates to the minds derived from language. Scholars recognize that Chomsky does not refer to the first reality because his concept of language does not appear in the series of communicative, impressionistic, reflexive acts or what is called recall. Since it does not manifest in this manner, as contemporary studies before him have concluded, he focuses on the other aspect: that language is a center for thought and a starting point for all preparedness that arises from it.
In light of this epistemological movement, it has become customary to perceive a discernible mind within language. Its system does not resemble artificial structures wholly controlled by the human mind. According to its precise systemic description, this system is not influenced by the external universe. When it is internally constructed, it aligns with our minds, which express their essence through preparedness. Language, thereafter, has found a way to preserve this degree of rationality. This rationality becomes evident in the bifurcation between the formal, universal language (Fusha) and its dialects. For instance, the linguistic lexicon serves as a meticulous observer of historical movements. All lexical modifications within this movement trace their way back to its profound depths on one side and to its final communicative form on the other.
Thus, the path leading to the linguistic depths alone is not what reveals the hidden mind of language, but also the modes of its usage. For example, phonetic variations return to a singular abstract phoneme, morphological structures follow a similar principle, and syntactic structures are an abstract mind in themselves. So, where do the breaches in this system arise? We will trace the foundations of this theory back to Chomsky, as he presents an exemplary case for observing points of collision and confusion in mental resources through his linguistic examples. Without denying the fact that the intellect of this man surpasses the language he sought to give a unique dimension to, it is worth noting that his universal intellectual rules are subject to experimentation—a clear weakness that cannot be overlooked.
Chomsky states:
“It is possible to exclude the deep structure, the surface structure, and the logical form in its technical sense on a principled basis, leaving only the levels of interface. There exists a principled explanation for the widely observed phenomenon of displacement with interpretive options in phonetically silent positions. From the same perspective, every other approach to this phenomenon bears an empirical burden.”
The linguistic mental framework does not appear to suffer from experimental breaches, but Chomsky’s problem lies in the linguistic example that maintains the integrity of the framework until the end. According to the general principle, the linguistic mind transitions from a deep structure to a surface structure and vice versa. We adhere to both directions when we say:
“Issa threw the stick.”
And if we change the order to:
“The stick was thrown by Issa,”
We will have voluntarily exchanged between two levels indicated by the surface structure. However, this does not suffice when the exchange occurs between two different levels, as in the verse:
“Our Lord, do not hold us accountable if we forget or make a mistake.” (Surah Al-Baqarah: 286).
The difference lies in the fact that language does not provide a direct link between “We call upon you, our Lord” and “O our Lord.” The inferred implicit meaning necessitates an unspoken transition, indicating that language moves towards logical determinism. Since this transition cannot be calculated precisely, Chomsky suggests that only the moment of confrontation remains, favoring one deterministic option that adheres to rationally coded systems. We can support Chomsky’s view with an example from the Quranic verse:
“And O my people! This is the she-camel of Allah—a sign for you.” (Surah Hud: 64).
In this noble verse, we can easily dispense with the division between surface and deep structures and understand it without resorting to logical interpretation. Here, we encounter a conditioned transition from the information conveyed to a specification of this information, facilitated by the act of pointing.
It is evident that Chomsky fails to find convincing answers to his propositions within his own language, forcing him to rely on experimentation.
If we revisit the statement:
“This is Abdullah, departing,”
One of Sibawayh’s examples, we notice that we are navigating a precise trajectory that extends beyond the mere information conveyed. This trajectory emerges because the predicate is not a fleeting or self-contained sequence. Instead, we are able to activate the attributive aspect within it and rebuild it according to the nature of the confrontation faced by the predicate. This aligns with computational systems and reorganizing its internal structure in the way Chomsky envisions.
Subsequently, Arabic precision assumes—indeed, proves—that preparing the mind and its readiness for confrontation is linked to a linguistic constraint, whose purpose is to act as a pliable tool that mirrors the mode of thought. This synchronization between linguistic constraints and layers of mental thought leads to a singular conclusion: the connection between thought and linguistic constraints. Thought is inherently free and has manifested its constraints in language solely for the sake of communication. This, specifically, is what Arabic uniquely provides, with countless examples to support it.
What Western scholars propose, however, suggests that the intersection between language and thought is not so straightforward. Chomsky complains about linguistic constraints, claiming they render some ideas inexpressible except through excessive elaboration and circumlocution, hindering communication. He relies on representing the interaction between language and thought as a coupling of internal syntactic structures with sensory-motor interfaces, even though this representation is considered secondary. He also attributes complexity, diversity, and the effects of historical events in language to morphology and phonology. According to him, the solution lies in introducing unlimited merging between two non-isomorphic systems of interface, producing a unified language of thought alongside the base for subordinate operations of phonetic realization.
When it comes to Arabic, the integration of the internal cognitive level with the sensory interface in syntactic structure has undergone multiple stages. These stages have refined linguistic constraints to serve this integration. For example, well-known Arabic structures, such as interrogatives, have successfully combined thought systems with their immediate sensory and intentional objectives. Having succeeded in this, Arabic leaves a clear demarcation to preserve the distinctiveness of each. In the verse:
“Have you not considered those who exchanged the favor of Allah for disbelief and led their people to the house of destruction?” (Surah Ibrahim: 28).
The text seems to build on a single center—“Have you not seen?”—evoking informational premises in the text. There is a visual perception that occurred in the past, and the text delays its construction to an internal realm, rather than a sensory area where both directions ascend. It focuses on the internal aspect to reach that past. Thus, Arabic demonstrates a method of thinking.
This method starts with a sequence compatible with the graduated mental capacity, beginning with points of inference. It reveals linguistic expressions used for reasoning. Hence, the act of seeing becomes inferential, progressing to points of inference expressed linguistically through terms like “What,” “How,” “Why,” etc. In essence, this Quranic text consolidates and perfects thought systems without requiring experimentation between them.
Chomsky himself acknowledged that thought systems do not express themselves linguistically except through reasoning, interpretation, and organizing sensory and mental actions. The Quranic verse integrates all of these simultaneously.
When the text shifts to sensory confrontation, it does not abandon intellectual engagement. We may enjoy unraveling the ultimate meaning of the interrogative—whether it is rhetorical, denoting denial or negation. However, we understand that the interrogative style does not directly present us with this conclusion. Instead, it transitions and unveils its stages, addressing us infinitely. Most importantly, it emphasizes the timelessness of its discourse.
In conclusion, Arabic has achieved what Chomsky refers to as “internal language,” reaching even deeper dimensions. Its structure is inseparable from general human intellectual effort—if not its origin—assuming we accept it as the original human language. Dr. Muhammad Bahjat Al-Athari encapsulated this idea in his description of Arabic: “It is closer to natural order and adherence, instinctively and innately, than these widely spread languages.” (Cairo, 1976).
Ultimately, we arrive at a fixed truth: language governs the experimental cognitive dimension, not the other way around. The phenomenon of merging two distinct levels to achieve parallelism (cognitive-sensory) in linguistic construction requires deeper reflection, which we will revisit in a subsequent article, God willing.
